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IV

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 20000626-SC

v.
LARRY DEAN COLEMAN,

Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a state's appeal from the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to
dismiss charges of operation of a clandestine laboratory, a first degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or (b) (1998); possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2000);l and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998) (all attached in Add.
A).

^ i s statute has been amended since the date of the offense in this case.
However, the amendments do not affect the subsection under which defendant was
charged. Accordingly, the State cites herein to the most recent version of the statute.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j)
(1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court err in determining that 114 of the days which had passed
since the filing of defendant's request for disposition under Utah's speedy trial statute
were attributable to the State, thereby warranting dismissal of all charges under the Utah
statute?
The determination of whether various delays in bringing a defendant to trial toll
the time for trying the defendant under Utah's speedy trial statute constitutes a legal
question reviewed on appeal for correctness. See State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911,914
(Utah 1998).
This issue was preserved below at (R. 39-47, 56-67, 93-95; 289:4-37).
2. Alternatively, did the trial court commit plain error when it dismissed all three
charges pending against defendant based on a violation of his statutory speedy trial right
when defendant had invoked the speedy trial statute only as to one charge?
This claim involves interpretation of a statute and, thus, presents a question of law
reviewed for correctness. State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, fl 1, 997 P.2d 314, cert,
denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000); State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah App. 1997).
Because the State did not object to the dismissal of all three charges before the trial court,
this Court will review the claim for plain error. See State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^[56,
3

979 P.2d 799, reh'g denied (6/16/99). Plain error exists where an error occurs which is
obvious and substantially prejudicial. Id
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), is relevant to the issues presented on appeal and
is contained in its entirety in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Because the chronology of the proceedings in this matter is critical in applying
Utah's statute on speedy trial rights, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), the relevant dates
and corresponding undisputed facts are presented as follows:
Sept. 28, 1999

Defendant is arrested for: 1) operating a clandestine
laboratory; 2) possession of methamphetamine with intent to
distribute; and 3) possess of drug paraphernalia (R. 4).

Oct 13, 1999

The prosecutor authorizes the filing of charges (R. 289:11).

Oct. 19, 1999

An information is filed charging defendant with: 1) operating
a clandestine laboratory; 2) possession of methamphetamine
with intent to distribute; and 3) possession of drug
paraphernalia (R. 3-4).

Oct. 27, 1999

Defendant makes his initial court appearance (R. 289:11).

Oct. 28, 1999

Defendant executes a written document entitled "Notice and
Request for Disposition of Pending Charges(s) [sic]"
[hereinafter "disposition request"] (R. 42) (in Add. C). The
only charge listed on this document is "clandestine lab" (id.).

Nov. 2, 1999

Defendant requests a preliminary hearing, asking that it be set
thirty daysfromthis date (R. 285:2; 289:11). Per defendant's
disposition request, the hearing is set for November 30 (14;
285:2; 289:11).
4

Nov. 15, 1999

The apparent date stamped on defendant's written disposition
request as the date it was received by the Utah State Prison,
Wasatch Records Division (R. 42; 289:10, 32).

Nov. 30, 1999

The State appears in court ready for the preliminary hearing
(R. 289:18, 20). Defendant's counsel notes a possible conflict
of interest in counsel's representation of both defendant and
his wife and obtains a continuance to December 21, 1999, to
deal with it (R. 289:6-7, 11, 18-19).

Dec. 6, 1999

Both the district attorney and the authorized agent at the
prison receive defendant's written disposition request (R.
289:11, 19). The prison agent prepares and signs a cover
letter and sends copies of the documents to the Salt Lake
District Attorney's Office and to the district court (R. 289:11).

Dec. 21, 1999

The preliminary hearing is continued on defendant's motion
to Jan. 20, 2000 (R. 19; 289:15, 33).2

Jan. 20,2000

The preliminary hearing is begun (R. 21-23; 289:19). The
hearing stops before it is completed because the judge has
another appointment and because defendant wants to
subpoena an additional witness (R. 289:19-20,28, 30-31).
The court attempts to set the remainder of the hearing for
February 1, but defense counsel is unavailable (R. 289:20-21).
The next available date is February 24 (R. 289:21).

Feb. 24, 2000

The remainder of the preliminary hearing is held, and
defendant is bound over for trial on all charges (R. 32-35;
289:15, 21). Arraignment is set for March 20, 2000 (R. 33,
35; 289:21).

2

Because the thirty-day delay was granted on defendant's motion, the time would
normally be counted against defendant and the running of the 120-day disposition period
would be tolled. See State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 916 (Utah 1998). However, the
prosecutor below accepted responsibility for this time period, and the trial court relied on
that representation in making its calculation (R. 289:22-23, 33). Accordingly, the State
does not seek on appeal to hold this thirty-day period against defendant.

Mar. 20, 2000

Defendant appears in district court and requests a hearing date
for his anticipated motion to suppress and motion to dismiss,
the latter being based on an alleged violation of his statutory
speedy trial rights (R. 36-37; 289:21-22).

Mar. 24, 2000

Defendant files his "Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to a Filing of U.C.A. 77-29-1(1)
Prisoner's Demand for Disposition of Pending Charge" (R.
39-47). Defendant did not file the corresponding motion to
dismiss, despite the trial court's direction that he do so (R.93).

Mar. 27, 2000

Defendant files his motion to suppress (R. 48).

May 15, 2000

A hearing on both motions is held (R. 93-94; 288:1-148; 289:
1-37). The judge holds that six days remain of the 120-day
period and notes that she cannot try the case within that time
(R. 93; 289: 33-34, 36-37). She holds that unless the State
has the case brought before another judge within six days, she
will dismiss the charges with prejudice (R. 93; 289: 36-37).

May 23, 2000

An order of dismissal is entered (R. 95-96).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Acting pursuant to a tip from the manager of the Quality Inn and Suites in Sandy,
Utah, and armed with an outstanding warrant for the arrest of the renter of room #310,
Jamie Brett Coleman, Officer Eddie Christensen knocked on the door of room #310 and
announced himself as a police officer (R. 4-5; 289:20). Jamie Coleman answered the
door, stepping into the hallway to speak to the officer (R. 5). Officer Christensen told her
thatshe was under arrest, and Officer Keri Geer accompanied Coleman back into the
room so that the latter could get dressed (id,). Officer Geer immediately noticed in plain
view marijuana and several items and chemicals commonly found in methamphetamine

6

laboratories (id.). Consequently, the officers also arrested the other occupant of the room,
defendant Larry Dean Coleman (id.). Pursuant to written permission from Jamie, the
officers thereafter searched the room, finding various chemicals and precursors capable of
producing methamphetamine, twenty-four grams of finished methamphetamine, and a bag
of marijuana (id.).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I: Once an incarcerated defendant has properly delivered a written request
for disposition of charges to custodial authorities at the prison, the prosecutor must bring
defendant to trial within 120 days or suffer dismissal of the charges identified in the
disposition request. The time period may be tolled or temporarily waived by defendant or
extended for "good cause" as determined by the trial court.
In this case, the trial court held that as of the time of the hearing on defendant's
motion to dismiss for violation of his statutory speedy trialright,only six days remained
in the 120-day period under the statute. As she could not set the trial within six days, and
the prosecutor was unsuccessful in her attempts to find a judge able to do so, the trial
judge dismissed the charges against defendant upon expiration of the remaining six days.
However, in computing the elapsed time in this case, the trial court erroneously attributed
to the State forty days of delay. Because the full time period had not elapsed as of entry
of the ruling below, defendant's statutory speedy trialrighthad not been violated and
dismissal was inappropriate.

7

Point II: Alternatively, should this Court find that the district court properly
computed the elapsed time, it should affirm dismissal of the "clandestine lab" charge
expressly mentioned in defendant's written disposition request but reverse the dismissal
of the remaining two charges, inasmuch as defendant failed to invoke the statute as to
those charges. The burden is on the defendant to properly invoke the statute before the
time period will commence, and the statute expressly provides that it is invoked upon
delivery to the custodial officials of "a written demand specifying the nature of the charge
and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge . . . "
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999). As defendant's written disposition request
referenced only the "clandestine lab" charge, it was plain error for the trial court to
dismiss all three charges pending against defendant because he had failed to invoke the
statute as to two of them.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DISMISSAL WAS ERROR BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
MISCALCULATED THE ELAPSED TIME, ERRONEOUSLY
ATTRIBUTING TO THE STATE SEVENTEEN DAYS PROPERLY
ATTRIBUTABLE TO DEFENDANT AND TWENTY-THREE DAYS
JUSTIFIED BY GOOD CAUSE
The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss because the court
miscalculated the time which had elapsed prior to the granting of the motion. Instead of
having six days remaining in the 120-day statutory period, as the trial court found, the

8

State had forty-six days in which it could still bring defendant to trial under the relevant
state statute (R. 289:32-37) (in Add. D).3
The trial court's granting of defendant's motion to dismiss was based on its legal
conclusion that only twenty-one of the days which passed between delivery of
defendant's disposition request to the prison authorities and the filing of his motion to
suppress were attributable to defendant and therefore tolled the 120-day period.4 The
determination of whether various delays in bringing a defendant to trial toll the time for
bringing the matter to trial under Utah's speedy trial statute constitutes a legal question
reviewed on appeal for correctness. See State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1998).
Utah's disposition of detainers statute is designed to promote the prompt
prosecution of charges against prisoners, to ensure trial while witnesses are available and
memories are fresh, and to more precisely define "speedy trial" as it applies under our

3

Defendant relied exclusively on his statutory speedy trialrightbelow.
Accordingly, this Court need not address therightunder the State or U.S. Constitutions.
4

To clarify the periods of conflict targeted by the State's argument, counsel has
attached in Addendum E a chart identifying the trial court's computation below and the
State's proposed computation and clearly illustrating the two periods challenged in this
appeal.
Further, because defendant never filed a written motion to dismiss, and his motion
to suppress was heard at the same time as his motion to dismiss, the State uses the filing
of his motion to suppress as the date which finally tolled the running of the disposition
period. See State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325,1329-30 (Utah 1986) (the filing of a motion
to dismiss for a speedy trial violation tolls the running of the disposition period); State v.
Velasquez. 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982) (any delay occasioned by defendant
constitutes a temporary waiver of his statutory speedy trialrightand does not count
toward the disposition period).
9

state constitution. State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985); State v. Wilson. 22
Utah 2d 361,453 P.2d 158, 159 (Utah 1969) (addressing purpose of previous version of
statute). The statute outlines the responsibilities of both parties in bringing about a
speedy resolution of charges. While the prosecution carries the ultimate burden of
bringing the matter to trial within 120 days of the filing of a disposition request,
defendant has the threshold burden of ensuring that the statute is properly invoked.
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915-16 (when a prisoner delivers a written notice pursuant to the
statute, then the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the matter heard in 120 days;
120 days does not start until notice is properly delivered under the statute); State v.
Petersen. 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991) (describing prosecutor's burden); State v.
Wright 745 P.2d 447,450-51 (Utah 1987) (the disposition request must be properly sent
to therightpeople and contain an appropriate demand to be effective); Viles. 702 P.2d at
1175 (the burden is on the prisoner to give proper notice before being entitled to have
charges disposed of in the statutory period); Wilson. 453 P.2d at 160 (describing
prosecutor's burden). Moreover, once a defendant has properly invoked the statute to
start the 120-day period running and to shift the burden to the prosecution to ensure a
timely trial, he must not unduly delay matters or the delay may be charged against him
and the 120-day period extended. Heaton. 958 P.2d at 916; State v. Banner. 717 P.2d
11325,1329-30 (Utah 1986); State v. Velasquez. 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982). Further,
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the disposition period may be extended for "good cause." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3)
and (4).
The State does not challenge the trial court's decision to begin counting at
November 15, 1999-the date stamped on defendant's written disposition request by the
Utah State Prison records department as the date they received the disposition request.5
In fact, the majority of the trial court's computation was correct. However, the
computation is incorrect at three points: 1) the three days between March 27 and 30, 2000
(R. 48; 289:33, 35); 2) the fourteen-day period between November 15 and 30, 1999 (R.
289:32); and 2) the twenty-three-day period between February 1 and 24, 2000 (R.
289:33).
The first miscalculation was a simple mistake on the part of the trial court. The
trial court believed that defendant filed his motion to dismiss on March 30,2000 (R.
289:35). However, defendant never filed a written motion to dismiss. Instead, he filed a
memorandum "supporting" a motion to dismiss on March 24,2000, and he filed a motion
to suppress evidence along with a supporting memorandum on March 27, 2000 (R. 39-47,
48-55). The hearing on May 15,2000, encompassed both the dismissal and suppression
issues (R. 288:1-148; 289: 1-37). The filing of the memorandum supporting the dismissal
motion, even without the motion itself, arguably tolled the disposition period. See

5

The record does not contain any explanation for the subsequent twenty-one day
delay in forwarding the necessary information to the district attorney and the district
court.
11

Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914 (delay caused by defendant will be held against him); Banner.
717 P.2d at 1329-30 (same); Velasquez. 641 P.2d at 116 (same). However, the filing of
the motion to suppress definitely delayed the proceedings and tolled the time period. See
Heaton. 958 P.2d at 914; Banner. 717 P.2d at 1329-30; Velasquez. 641 P.2d at 116.
Hence, the trial court should have used March 27, if not March 24, in its calculations, and
at least the three days between March 27 and 30 should not have been counted against the
State.
The court's second miscalculation occurred because defendant filed his disposition
request during a period of delay attributable to himself. The trial court began its
calculation from the date the request was delivered rather than from the end of the delay
period. The time period under the speedy trial statute commences upon proper delivery of
the written disposition request to the custodial authorities. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1);
Viles. 702 P.2d at 1176. The trial court found that to be November 15, 1999, which
would normally mean that the disposition calculations would start November 16 (R.
289:32). However, at that time, the case was already in a period of delay caused by
defendant's actions in court on November 2. At a hearing on November 2, defendant not
only requested a preliminary hearing, but expressly requested that it be set thirty days
away, instead of allowing it to be set within the ten-day period provided by rule 7(g)(2),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 14; 285:2; 289:11). The preliminary hearing was
then set for November 30, and no reason for the late setting appears on the record except

12

defendant's express request (id.). As the hearing would have been set on or before
November 12 under normal circumstances, the delay between November 12 and 30
should be attributed to defendant. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914; Velasquez. 641 P.2d at
116. Consequently, the entire fifteen-day period between November 15th, when the 120
days commenced, and November 30th, when the preliminary hearing was scheduled to
occur, should be tolled. See Heaton. 958 P.2d at 914.
Finally, the trial court improperly counted against the State a twenty-three-day
delay incurred to accommodate defense counsel's schedule. The period between
February 1 and February 24, 2000, was attributable to "good cause" and, hence, should
have tolled the disposition period. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) and (4). The reason
why these twenty-three days should not be counted against the State relates to events of
January 20, 2000. The preliminary hearing began on that date but was not completed (R.
21-23; 289:19-20, 28, 30-31). The matter was continued for two reasons: 1) the trial judge
had another commitment that afternoon; and 2) defense counsel wanted to subpoena an
officer who was not present on that date (R. 289:19-20, 28, 30-31). The judge proposed
continuing the hearing until February 1, the next available date on the court's calendar (R.
289:20-21). However, defense counsel was unavailable on that date (id.). The next date
available to both the court and defense counsel was February 24 (R. 289:21).
Consequently, although the preliminary hearing was continued in part due to a
commitment of the judge, it occurred twenty-three days later than necessary solely to
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accommodate defense counsel's schedule. Hence, the delay constitutes "good cause"
under section 77-29-1(3) and (4) and should not be counted in the disposition calculation.
See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 ("extending the trial date to a reasonable time outside the
disposition period to accommodate, in part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes 'good
cause' under section 77-29-1(3) and (4)"); State v. Bonnv. 477 P.2d 147, 148 (Utah 1970)
(setting the trial outside the statutory period to accommodate defense counsel's schedule
was "entirely reasonable and practical").
The trial court calculated that 114 days of the disposition period had passed at the
time of the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 289:33). The three time periods
challenged by the State amount to forty days. If these days were properly excluded from
the trial court's calculation, the elapsed time would have amounted to 74 days, leaving 46
days in which to bring defendant to trial under the statute. As the full 120 days had not
elapsed, dismissal was not appropriate. The trial court's dismissal should be reversed and
the case remanded for further proceedings.6

Alternatively, this Court need not agree with the State's calculation in its entirety
in order to reverse and remand this matter. Thefirstof the three periods of miscalculation
was simply a mistake on the part of the trial court as to the filing of defendant's motion.
While both of the remaining periods of delay were justified by "good cause" or were
caused by defendant and, hence, should be held against him and used to toll the running
of the 120-day disposition period, this Court need only agree with one or the other of
these periods, as either one is sufficient by itself to warrant reversal of the dismissal order
and a remand for further proceedings. The shortest of these two periods, added to the six
days remaining under the trial court's calculation, leaves the State twenty days in which to
bring defendant to trial. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial could not
have occurred within that period of time.
14

POINT II
ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY
DISMISSING TWO CHARGES WHICH WERE NOT INCLUDED IN
DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN DISPOSITION REQUEST
Should this Court determine that the trial court properly calculated the disposition
period, it should nevertheless examine the scope of the dismissal order. The trial court
committed plain error in dismissing all three of the charges pending against defendant
based on violation of the speedy trial statute. Defendant invoked the statute only as to
one charge. As the statute was not properly invoked as to the remaining two charges, the
State should be free to pursue them against defendant.
Because the prosecutor failed to raise this issue below, it is reviewed on appeal for
plain error. To establish plain error, the State must show that "(0 an error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Adams. 2000 UT 42,120, 395
Utah Adv. Rep. 3.
Section 77-29-1(1) details the steps defendant must take to properly invoke the
statute:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information,
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying the
nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition
of the pending char2e. he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial
within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
15

(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that the
failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time
required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
(Emphasis added) (in Add. B).
The plain and unambiguous language of the statute requires that in order for a
defendant's written disposition request to be effective, it must expressly include: 1) the
nature of the charge; 2) the court in which the charge is pending; and 3) a request for
disposition "of the pending charge ..." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1). Defendant
submitted a written disposition notice, entitled "Notice and Request for Disposition of
Pending Charges'* (R. 42). The notice was pre-printed with various blanks filled in by
defendant. That notice provides:
NOTICE is hereby given that I, Larrv Coleman, do hereby request final
disposition of any charge(s) now pending against me in any court in the State of
Utah. Charges of clandestine lab are now pending against me in the Third District
Court, Salt Lake, [sic] County, and request is hereby made that you forward this
notice to the appropriate authorities in that county, together with such other
information as required by law.
(R. 42, underlined phrases are blanks filled in by defendant) (attached in Add. C).
Defendant had in fact been charged with operating a clandestine laboratory prior to the
filing of his disposition request (R. 3-4). However, he was also charged with possession
of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia (id.). Defendant's failure to
14

even mention the remaining two charges in his written disposition request prevents
application of section 77-29-1 to those charges. See, e.g.. Aranza v. State, 213 Ga.App.
192, 193, 444 S.E.2d 349, 350 (Ga.App. 1994) (defendant's demand, which failed to
identify the charges upon which he demanded a speedy trial by name, date, term of court,
or case number "cannot reasonably be construed as sufficient to put the authorities on
notice of a defendant's intention to invoke the extreme sanction" of dismissal; hence the
time never commenced), cert, denied (9/8/94); see also Cummins v. State. 202 Ga.App.
155, 155-56, 413 S.E.2d 773, 774 (Ga.App. 1992) (same), cert, denied (1/10/92): Ferris v.
State. 172 Ga.App. 729, 731, 324 S.E.2d 762, 764-65 (Ga.App. 1984) (same).
The only description of the nature of the charges defendant sought to include in his
written disposition request is the phrase "clandestine lab." The phrase "clandestine lab"
does nothing to identify the remaining charges, let alone impart the nature of those
charges, and it gives no notice of defendant's desire to have the remaining charges
promptly disposed of. On the contrary, the fact that defendant specified only one of three
charges seems to suggest he did not care about speedy disposition of the remaining two
charges. Those charges were viable independent of the State's ability to establish the
existence of the clandestine lab. The simple fact that all the offenses were discovered at
the same time and charged in the same information does not relieve defendant of his
burden of identifying the nature of each pending charge in order to impose upon the State
the burden of complying with the speedy trial statute. Neither is defendant relieved of that
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burden by the presumption that the prosecutor knew of the existence of the charges. Cf.
Wright 745 P.2d at 451 (letterfromdefense counsel to the county attorney inquiring
about prosecution of defendant did not trigger section 77-29-1 because, among other
things, the letter did not "specify the charges, as required by section 77-29-1(1)."); Viles,
702 P.2d at 1176 (a notice of appearance filed by defendant's counsel, including a plea of
"not guilty" and a request that defendant be granted a trial upon the charge, was not
sufficient to meet the requirements for invoking section 77-29-1 because, among other
things, it "did not specify the nature of the charge").
Because the entire prosecution lies in the balance under this statute, strict
compliance by defendant with the minimal requirements to trigger the statute should be
required. Defendant need only provide a minimum of readily-available information in
writing to his custodial authorities, who then are responsible for adding additional
information and actual delivery of the disposition request to the appropriate entities. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-29-1; Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915-16; Wright 745 P.2d at 450-51; Viles,
702 P.2d at 1175. Charges must be pending before defendant may invoke the statute,
making it easy for the defendant to identify the nature of the pending charges and the
court having jurisdiction- Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1). There is no need for any entity
involved in the prosecution or management of the case to have to guess as to the scope of
the disposition request.
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In this case, defendant submitted his written disposition request after the charges
were filed and after he had been appointed counsel (R. 3-4, 11,, 42). He was in the best
position possible to determine and include in his disposition request all the charges he
intended to submit to this expedited process. It is not unduly burdensome to require
under these circumstances that proper invocation include, at a minimum, identifying each
pending charge defendant intends the disposition request to cover, especially as the
penalty for the State's failure to act promptly under the statute is extreme-dismissal with
prejudice of all identified pending charges.
Because the disposition request unnecessarily and unjustifiably fails to name two
of the three charges pending against defendant, let alone identify the nature of those
charges, the statute was not properly invoked as to those charges. The error in dismissing
the two charges was obvious given the express language of both the statute and the
disposition request, and it was prejudicial in that it prevented further prosecution on both
of the unnamed charges. Accordingly, dismissal of those two charges should be reversed
and proceedings allowed to continue as to them.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial court's order dismissing the charges against defendant, in whole or in part, and
remand the case for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisr 7 / day of December, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of
a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection
(lXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as denned
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXaXiv) is guilty of a
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place

knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations, or
(in) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to
(1) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony,
(u) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony, or
(in) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Kb)
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2)
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2Kb)(i), (n), or (in),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is
guilty of a third degree felony
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXn) or (2)(a)(iii) is
d) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor,
(n) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and
(m) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally
d) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
cuntrolled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person,
(n) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address,
(m) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued oi written under the terms of this chapter, or

dv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a
third degree felony
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher
naha Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed
(l) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools,
(n) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions,
(in) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (n),
dv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility,
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center,
(vi) in a church or synagogue,
(vn) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto,
(vm) in a public parking lot or structure,
dx) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (4)(aXi) through (vni), or
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of
age, regardless of where the act occurs
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years
if the penalty that would otherwise have hpen established but for this
subsection would have been a first degree felony Imposition or execution
of the sentence may not be suspended and the person is not eligible for
probation
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4),
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age, nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a)
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to ind
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorize d by
law

(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance
or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, ft 8; 1972, ch. 22,
ft 1; 1977, ch. 29, ft 6; 1979, ch. 12, ft 5; 1985,
ch. 146, ft 1; 1966, ch. 196, ft 1; 1967, ch. 92,
ft 100; 1967, ch. 190, ft 3; 1966, ch. 95, ft 1;
1969, ch. 50, ft 2; 1969, ch. 56, ft 1; 1969, ch.
176, ft 1; 1969, ch. 187, ft % 1969, ch. 201, ft 1;
1990, ch. 161, ft 1; 1990, ch. 163, ft 2; 1990,
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Amendment Notes. - The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, deleted former
Subsection (6) which read "Any person who
attempts or conspires to commit any offense
unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction
guilty of one degree less than the maximum

penalty prescribed for that offense," redesignating the other subsections accordingly.
The 1999 amendment by ch 12, effective May
3,1999, substituted "in the immediate presence
0r for "with" in Subsection (4XaXx) and made
minor stylistic changes in Subsections (2) and
(4).
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58-37a-5. Unlawful acts.
{V> It is unlawfulfoxany peisoii to us*, OT te possess ^\th v&tent \x> v&% di-ug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violatioo of this chapter. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze,
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act.
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: L» 1981, ch* 7«* I &
Cfoss-References, — '"•entencina; for feloMeaning of "this act.* — The term "this niest §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
act" means Laws 1981, ch. 76, H 1 to 6, which
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
enacted §J 58-37a-l to 58-37a-«.
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony,
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally:
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage
in a clandestine laboratory operation;
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage
in a clandestine laboratory operation;
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act,
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distributed or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation;
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized
under Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within
this state or any other location.
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second
degree felony.
History: C. 1963, 58-37d-4, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 156, S 4; 1997, ch. 64, § 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5 t 1997, added Subsections

(IXf) and (g) and made atyiistic changes accordingiy.
Croee-Referencee. — Sentencing for felonies, §S 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.

ADDENDUM B

77-29-1. Prisoner 'a demand for disposition of pending
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continuance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for
failure to bring to trial.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified,
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
History: C. 1963, 77-29-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch, 15, § 2.

Croat-References. — Right to speedy trial
Utah Const, Art. I, § 12; § 77-1-6.

ADDENDUM C

NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF
PENDING CHARGES(S)
TO: FREDERICK VANDERVEUR, DIRECTOR
UTAH STATE PRISON/CENTRAL UTAH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
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IN- THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COI
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

* * *

ORIGINAL
STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,
CASE NO. CR-99-1920661

VS.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

JAMIE BRETT COLEMAN,
DEFENDANT.
STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,

CASE NO. CR-99-1920662

VS.
LARRY DEAN COLEMAN,

MOTION TO DISMISS

DEFENDANT.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDITH S. ATHERTON

MAY 15, 2000

REPORTED BY:

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.

0028H
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CASE THAT I HAD.
THE COURT:
MR. VALDEZ:

BUT YOU FILED THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
I DID FILE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

AND

WE TOLD THE COURT ON THE DAY THAT WE WERE FILING THE MOTION
TO SUPPRESS -THE COURT:
MR. VALDEZ:
ARRAIGNMENT.

RIGHT.
--ON THE DAY THAT WE WERE HERE FOR

IN FACT, SHE KNEW FROM THE DAY THAT THE

PRELIMINARY HEARING WENT THAT WE WERE GOING TO FILE A MOTION
TO SUPPRESS.

AND WE INDICATED THAT WE NEEDED THAT OTHER

WITNESS, AN ESSENTIAL WITNESS, AND I THINK IT'S OFFICER GEER,
BECAUSE WE INTEND TO FILE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

AND THAT WAS

BACK ON THE 20TH OF JANUARY.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

ALL RIGHT.

THIS IS WHAT I'M

CALCULATING IN TERMS OF TIME PERIODS.
FIRST, THE DEFENDANT FILED HIS 120-DAY DISPOSITION
PAPERS ON OCTOBER 28TH.

I'M FINDING THAT THE OPERATIVE DATE

TO BEGIN CALCULATING THE 120-DAY PERIOD IS NOVEMBER 16TH.
AND THAT IS GIVING THE BENEFIT, FRANKLY, TO THE STATE PRISON.
ONCE IT'S AT LEAST LOGGED IN TO THE STATE, THE PRISON
RECORDS, IT'S THE DUTY OF THE PRISON TO MOVE IT IMMEDIATELY
FORWARD.

SO THAT'S THE DATE I'M STARTING FROM, BETWEEN

NOVEMBER 16TH AND NOVEMBER 30TH.

IT'S A 14-DAY PERIOD THAT

IS PART OF THE, THAT I'M CALCULATING AS PART OF THIS 120-DAY
PERIOD.
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I AM NOT, I AM TOLLING IT FOR THE PERIOD OF NOVEMBER
3 0TH UNTIL DECEMBER 21ST BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICT WITH
ATTORNEYS.
CONSISTENT WITH THE STATE TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE NEXT 30 DAYS, DECEMBER 21ST TO JANUARY 20TH, THAT IS
ADDED TO THE 120-DAY PERIOD.
FURTHER, I AM ADDING THE TIME BETWEEN JANUARY 20TH
AND MARCH 20TH WHICH I CALCULATE TO BE 60 DAYS.

IT DOESN'T

MATTER IF IT'S THE COURT OR IF IT'S THE STATE, IT NEEDS TO GO
FORWARD.

AND THERE'S NO REASON FOR ME NOT TO COUNT THOSE 60

DAYS.
I AM ALSO COUNTING AN ADDITIONAL 10 DAYS BETWEEN
MARCH 20TH AND MARCH 30TH. AND MY CALCULATION IS THAT AS OF
TODAY WE'RE AT 114 DAYS.

CLEAR ON MY CALCULATIONS?

I THINK THE MOTION, I FIND THAT THE MOTION TO
SUPPRESS DOES STAY BECAUSE THAT IS A DEFENDANT'S CHOICE, AND
YOU CERTAINLY HAVE A RIGHT TO HAVE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
BECAUSE OF THAT, TO HAVE THAT BE ADDED TO THE 120 DAYS
DOESN'T MAKE SENSE.

I THINK THERE'S GOOD CAUSE TO TOLL THAT

120 DAYS ON DEFENDANT'S FILING OF THAT MOTION.
SO WE'RE SIX DAYS OUT. AND I AM NOT GOING TO BE
ABLE TO TRY THIS CASE IN A SIX-DAY PERIOD, SIX DAYS.
STATE OR MR. VALDEZ?

IS THE

I MEAN, UNLESS WE GO TO TRIAL TOMORROW

AND I DENY THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS I CAN'T DO IT. AND I HAVE
TRIALS SET FOR THE REST OF THE WEEK.
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MS. BEATON:

MAYBE IF WE CAN GO THROUGH THE

CALCULATIONS AGAIN.

WE'RE GOING TO GO 11/16?

THE COURT:

11/30 IS 14 DAYS.

MS. BEATON:

JANUARY 20TH --

11/16 TO WHAT PERIOD?

THE COURT:

11/30.

MS. BEATON:

SO EVEN THOUGH DEFENSE COUNSEL REQUESTS

A 3 0-DAY CONTINUANCE TO THE PRELIMINARY HEARING THAT PERIOD
IS NOT GOING TO TOLL UNTIL DECEMBER 6TH?
THE COURT:

NO.

MS. BEATON:

OKAY.

THE COURT:

AND HOW MANY --

THE DATE WE'RE STARTING FROM IS NOVEMBER

16TH.
MS. BEATON:

OKAY.

THE COURT:

THERE'S FOURTEEN DAYS BETWEEN NOVEMBER

16TH AND NOVEMBER 30 •
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

1

OKAY.

AND THEN IT TOLLS FROM THE 3 0TH?

30TH TO DECEMBER 21ST.
OKAY.
IT CONTINUES FROM DECEMBER 21ST TO

JANUARY 20TH, WHICH IS 30 DAYS.

SO WE ARE NOW AT 44 DAYS.

JANUARY 20TH THROUGH MARCH 20TH I AM COUNTING -MS. BEATON:

EVEN THOUGH DEFENSE COUNSEL REQUESTED A

CONTINUANCE?
THE COURT:

WELL, THE CASE WAS TRIED THAT DAY, IT

WAS TRIED, THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS HELD THAT DAY AND ON
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MARCH 20TH.

BECAUSE THE COURT COULD NOT ACCOMMODATE THAT AT

ATTORNEY'S REQUEST DOES NOT MEAN IT TOLLS IT.

I MEAN, THE

COURT IS RESPONSIBLE TO MOVE THE CASES FORWARD TOO AND SO I
DON'T FIND ANY BASIS FOR TOLLING THE 120-DAY PERIOD BETWEEN
THOSE TWO DATES. AND THAT IS 60 DAYS, JANUARY 20TH TO
FEBRUARY 20TH, 29; FROM FEBRUARY 20TH TO MARCH 20TH.

AND THE

MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS FILED ON MARCH 30TH, 10 DAYS LATER.

I

AM TOLLING IT SUBSEQUENT TO THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. THAT'S
114 DAYS.
I CAN'T PLACE ANY WEIGHT ON COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS
BETWEEN PROSECUTING AGENCIES.

THE APPROPRIATE NOTICE WAS

GIVEN.
MS. BEATON:

THE STATE'S READY TO TRY IT, AND WITHIN

THE NEXT SIX DAYS IF WE NEED TO.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:
GO.

HOW MANY DAYS DO YOU NEED?
I CAN TRY HIM IN SIX.

I'LL BE READY TO

I WOULD RATHER DO THAT THAN DISMISS A FIRST DEGREE CLAN

LAB.
THE COURT:

ONE DAY, TWO DAYS?

MS. BEATON:

TWO.

MR. VALDEZ:

I THINK THREE DAYS FOR A CLAN LAB. AND

IT'S GOING TO REQUIRE -- IT'S GOING TO BE A TRIAL OF
CO-DEFENDANTS, I SUPPOSE.

THERE HASN'T BEEN A MOTION TO

SEVER.
THE COURT: WELL, I CAN'T TRY THIS CASE WITHIN THE
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NEXT SIX DAYS.
MR. VALDEZ:

I MOVE TO DISMISS THEN.

MS. BEATON:

THE STATUTE ALLOWS FOR CONTINUANCES TO

BE GRANTED UPON GOOD CAUSE.

THAT'S WHAT SAVED THE HEATON

CASE.
THE COURT:

BUT I CAN'T FIND THERE'S GOOD CAUSE.

WE'RE AT THE 11TH AND-A-HALF HOUR HERE AND THERE WERE MONTHS.
MS. BEATON:

THE ONLY CASE THAT WE'RE LOOKING AT IN

TERMS OF WHAT MR. VALDEZ WANTS THIS COURT TO LOOK AT IS THE
HEATON CASE.

THERE IS THE MAESTAS CASE.

AND THE COURT SAYS,

BASICALLY, IF THE DEFENDANT FILED A 120-DAY DISPOSITION BUT
THEN HIS ACTIONS WOULD INDICATE THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO DO
OTHER THINGS, ANY ACTIONS THAT HE TAKES THEN THE COURT CAN
DETERMINE THAT THE 120 DAYS HAS ESSENTIALLY BEEN WAIVED.

AND

I'M LOOKING AT -MR. VALDEZ:

YOU KNOW --

MS. BEATON:

JUST SO WE CAN BE SPECIFIC.

MR. VALDEZ:

HOW LONG ARE WE GOING TO ALLOW HER TO

ARGUE THE CASE, YOUR HONOR?
CHANCE TO ARGUE THE CASE.

I THINK BOTH PARTIES HAVE HAD A
THE COURT, IT SEEMS TO ME, HAS

MADE A DECISION, THE QUESTION NOW IS WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE
COULD BE TRIED IN SIX DAYS. AND WHERE, I SUPPOSE.
THE COURT:

RIGHT.

OKAY.

AS OF ONE WEEK FROM TODAY

I'M GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE.

IF YOU CAN GET

SOMEONE TO TRY IT THIS WEEK GO AHEAD AND TRY IT.

BUT I CAN'T

1

DO IT. AND I'LL WAIT FOR THE 12 0 DAYS TO RUN.

2

THAT'S A REQUEST THAT I CAN'T ACCOMMODATE, PERIOD, WITH MY

3

SCHEDULE.

4

MR. VALDEZ:

5

MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

6

THE COURT:

BUT YOU KNOW

I GUESS I BETTER STICK AROUND FOR THE

YEP.

ALL RIGHT.

HOW MANY -- AND,

7

MR. VALDEZ, YOU'LL PREPARE THAT ORDER?

8

MR. VALDEZ: YES, YOUR HONOR.

9 I

(WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED).

10
11 I

* * *

12
13
14 I
15
16
17
18 I
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. VALDEZ: MR. SCOWCROFT REPRESENTS THE
CO-DEFENDANT.
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. HOW MANY WITNESSES DO YOU
HAVE ON THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS?
MS. BEATON: THREE.

ADDENDUM E

TIMELINE:

14 days

Toll

30 days

60 days

10 days J Toll

TRCT:

u°

Toll
STATE:
(74 days counted)

11/2/99
11/15/99
D seeks a
Prison stamps
prelim hng D's request
30 days
received
away (is
set for 11/30)

11/30/99
D raises a
conflict;
gets a
continuance

12/21/99

days |

01/20/00
Part 1:
Prelim hng-stopped per
court & D

12 days

Toll

2/1/00
2/24/00
Ct avail, for Part 2:
part 2 of
Prelim hng
prelim: D
not available

25 days

3/20/00
Hearing

7 days

Toll

3/27/00 3/30/00
Mot to Ct believes
suppress mot to
filed
dismiss
filed

